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POPULATION CONTROL IN THE YEAR 2000-THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF PLACING ANTI-FERTILITY AGENTS IN THE WATER SUPPLY
A major reorientation in the thinking of the American people will have
to occur in the area of population control if the United States is going to
avoid the plague of overpopulation predicted by Malthus almost two hun-
dred years ago. Unfortunately, we are presently in a state of slumber which,
if continued, will mean that as many as 365 million Americans will be wel-
coming in the next century.1 The size of the problem may not seem prodi-
gious at first glance, but closer scrutiny will reveal that the situation in this
country may be more dire than even in India.2 A sniff of the New York air
or a swim in Lake Erie should be sufficient to cause one to wonder whether
we will even survive the next thirty years.
The average American today is as great a demon to his environment
as is the man-created chemical DDT.3 And this demon is growing at the
rate of 1o a year, a rate that will double our population in seventy years.4
To put it in more melodramatic terms, a 1%6 growth rate over the last five-
thousand years would have produced a contemporary population of 2.7
billion persons for each square foot of land.5
One year's crop of infants can be expected to use 200 million pounds of
steel, 25 billion pounds of beef, and 9.1 billion gallons of gasoline during
their lifetime. For every increment of 1,000 Americans, we will require
36.5 million gallons of water per year and enough sewers and treatment
plants to handle an additional 62,000 pounds of organic water pollutants
per year."
To make matters worse, the present population is destroying the land at
a rate of over a million acres a year. "We now [1970) have only 2.6
agricultural acres per person. By 1975 this will be cut to 2.2, the critical
point for the maintenance of what we consider a decent diet, and by the year
2000 we might expect to have 1.2. ' '  We must choose one or both of two
1 W. PETERSON, POPULATION 265 (2d ed. 1962).
2W. Davis, Overpopulated America, New Republic, Jan. 10, 1970, at 13-14 [Hereinafter
cited as W. Davis].
3 See, Id. at 14.
An American . .. can be expected to destroy land on which he builds a home,
garage, and driveway. He will contribute his share to the 142 million tons of smoke
and fumes, seven million junked cars, 20 million tons of paper, 48 billion cans, and
26 billion bottles which the overburdened environment must absorb each year. To
run his air-conditioner, he will stripmine a Kentucky hillside, push the dirt slate
down into the stream and burn coal in a power generator, whose smokestack contrib-
utes to a plume of smoke massive enough to cause cloud seeding and premature pre-
cipitation from Gulf winds which should be irrigating the wheat farms of Minnesota.
4 Lamm, The Reproduction Revolution, 56 A.B.A.J. 41, 42 (1970).
5 W. Davis, supra note 2 at 14.
6 CONSFRvATiON tOUNDATION NEWSLETTER, April 30, 1967, at 2.
7 W. Davis, supra note 2, at 14.
COMMENT
options if we are going to solve our population dilemma-we can either
lower the birth rate or raise the death rate.
The population problem of this country is not confined to our geographi-
cal parameters. With the world's population rate double ours, this means
the other countries will soon be making more and more demands on our
surplus food supply. A world that is projected to contain seven billion
people in the year 20008 may require the United States to radically decrease
its consumption of the world's goods. Famine conditions in the world may
demand that this country reexamine its traditional notion of national sov-
ereignty, the right of its people to the exclusive domain of the resources
within its border.
Famine and pollution are not the only deleterious consequences that
flow from overpopulation. In addition, the United States will find it neces-
sary to alter the ways in which its citizens relate.
Under conditions of such high density, human behavior of all kinds
would have to be rigidly controlled. Spontaneity could not be permitted;
individual variation would have to be virtually nil. What is at stake here
is no less than the survival of human society as we know it.9
Thus, not only may our children be hungry and their environment filthy,
but they may find it necessary to institute totalitarian controls in order to
keep the society "smoothly" functioning.
What has been done
Family planning is one of the most palatable plans offered so far in an
attempt to hold our population growth to bearable proportions. But for
the same reasons that it is palatable it is also futile. Family planning is
another way of saying contraception. The family planning method is to
supply new, more efficient contraceptive devices to our adult population.
In this way it is hoped that we will be able to lower our birth rate to support-
able proportions. A significant feature of such stated goals is the rapid
population growth it will allow. Unless the population growth rate is re-
duced to zero, our population will continue to rise towards oblivion.
The family planning technique is aimed at each individual family. The
unsoundness of such a method of population control becomes manifestly
apparent when viewed from the national scale.
Logically, it does not make sense to use family planning to provide
national population control or planning. The 'planning' in family plan-
ning is that of each separate couple. The only control they exercise is con-
trol over the size of their family. Obviously, couples do not plan the size
of the nation's population anymore than they plan the growth of the na-
8 TIm, Feb. 7, 1970, at 59.
9 A. Day, Population and Personal Freedom, 28 HUMA SxT 7 (1968).
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tional income or the form of the highway network. There is no reason to
believe that the millions of decisions about family size made by couples
in their own interest will automatically control population for the benefit
of society.' 0
The advocates of family planning have stated again and again that its aim
is to allow the family to have as many children as it desires. It is more
concerned with spacing than it is with lowering the birth rate. Since the
average family in this country desires 3.3 children,"' it is unlikely that con-
traceptives will provide a viable solution. Even if our new contraceptives
work perfectly, they will not prevent the typical family from having its 3.3
children. The voluntariness of the program dooms it to failure.
We thus see that the inadequacy of current population policies with the
respect to motivation is inherent in their overwhelming family-planning
character. Since family planning is by definition private planning, it
eschews any societal control over motivations. It merely furnishes the
means, and among possible means, only the most respectable. 12
In reality, the family planning program does more harm than good. Re-
liance on family planning enables people to feel that something is being
done about the problem when, in fact, very little is actually being achieved.
Family planning allows people to ignore the need for those painful changes
that must be instituted if this country-and for that matter this world-is
going to survive.
That the exclusive emphasis on family planning in current population
policies is not a 'first-step' but an escape from the real issues is suggested
by two facts. (i) No country has taken the 'next step.' The industrial
countries have had family planning for half a century without acquiring
control over either the birth rate or population increases. (ii) Support
and encouragement of research on population policy other than family
planning is negligible. It is precisely this blocking of alternative thinking
and experimentations that makes the emphasis on family planning a major
obstade to population control.' 3
The possibility of a starving world is something that can no longer be
ignored; and family planning is to ignore that possibility. If we are going
to overcome our environmental shortcomings, it is incumbent that this
country institute more advanced solutions. As Kingsley Davis has ob-
served,
Changes basic enough to affect motivation for having children would be
changes in the structure of the family, in the position of the women, and
in sexual mores. Far from proposing such radicalism, spokesmen for fam-
10 K. Davis, Population Policy: Will Present Policies Succeed? SCIENCE Nov. 11, 1967, at
732.
11 W. Davis, supra note 2, at 15.
12 K. Davis, supra note 10, at 734.
13 Id. at 737.
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ily planning frequently state their purpose as 'protection' of the family-
that is, closer observance of family norms.14
What is needed is a fertility control device that is involuntary in nature
so as not to suffer from the basic drawbacks of family planning. It should
be such that it can be easily taken by the entire populace. The method
should be harmless, and its effects must be reversible in case it is found to
be deleterious to the health of the society as a whole such as lowering the
population growth too radically. It should be inexpensive. In addition, it
should not interfere with the sexual activities of the persons affected. And,
of course, it should be constitutional.
One proposal that manifests promise is to add anti-fertility agents to the
water supply. Doses of the antidote would be carefully rationed by the
government to produce the desired population result. Such an agent would
be as simple to include in the drinking supply as fluoride. While such an
agent has not yet been developed, many scientists believe that it could be
produced in the foreseeable future.15 If the United States were to take the
initiative in employing this type of population control, it would then be
easier for us to convince the rest of the world that drastic population control
is urgently needed. Such an American program would alleviate the fear
that we were trying to weaken the rest of the world's population power
base by lowering its population rate.
The Griswold Doctrine
Griswold v. Connecticut,6 decided by a 7-2 majority, ruled unconstitu-
tional a Connecticut criminal statute which prohibited the use of contra-
ceptive devices by married couples. The case set aside the conviction of
the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut
who had "aided and abetted" a married couple in the use of contraceptives.
The unanticipated result of this case was the erection of a major constitu-
tional barrier to state action designed to regulate propagation.
Mr. Justice Douglas writing for the majority stated that there are certain
fundamental constitutional guarantees that are not specifically enumerated
in the Bill of Rights but are penumbras of such rights. These penumbras
are emanations from those specific guarantees that help to give them sub-
stance. The basis of Douglas' argument is that there are "zones of privacy"
created by the various rights found in the Bill of Rights.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, .... The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in
14 Id. at 734.
15 M. Ketchel, Fertility Control Agents as a Passive Solution to the World Population Prob-
kvm, Perspectives in Biological Medicine.
16 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another
facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. 17
Griswold, he goes on to say, concerns a situation which falls within the
constitutionally protected zone of privacy.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights--older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred .... [I]t is an association for as noble a purpose
as any involved in our prior decisions.' 8
The Court held one has a right to privacy in one's marital relations that
is protected by the "zone of privacy" created by the Bill of Rights. Since
the Connecticut statute attempted to invade that protected zone, it was there-
fore unconstitutional.
While the Griswold doctrine grants greater freedom to people in their
private relations, it is also a major deterrent against governmental action
that may attempt to regulate such behavior for the good of the community.
A question that is presented is whether state or federal action that is de-
signed to limit a couple's right to bear children via anti-fertility agents
placed in the water supply is constitutional in terms of Griswold. A due
to the answer is to be found in the concurring opinions.
The three concurring opinions were written by Justices Goldberg, Har-
lan, and White. Mr. Justice Goldberg in his opinion states:
Although I have not accepted the view that 'due process' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of the first eight Amendments...
I do agree that the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are
fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights.
My conclusion that the concept of liberty is not so restricted and that it
embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is not mentioned
explicitly in the Constitution is supported by numerous decisions .... 19
Goldberg then narrows in on the question of government regulation of
the marital relation.
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental
personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States
simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relation-
ship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. 'Where there is a sig-
nificant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only




19 Id. at 486-87.
20 1d. at 497.
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Goldberg further states, "Surely the Government, absent a showing of a
compelling subordinating state interest, could not decree that all husbands
and wives must be sterilized after two children have been born to them. "21
White, in his concurrence, reinforces the notions enunciated by Gold-
berg. He believes that statutes designed to limit the right of privacy in
marriage "if reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and
substantial state interest, and not arbitrary or capricious in application, are
not invalid under the Due Process Clause."22  Thus, it appears that while
privacy in marital relations is a fundamental right protected by the Consti-
tution, it may still be amenable to government regulation when a compel-
ling state interest is shown. If present population trends continue-and
there is no reason that they should not-a compelling state interest will
indeed exist at that junction in the future when anti-fertility agents are a
viable means of birth control. That state interest may involve our very
existence.
Free exercise of religion
The religious issue presented is whether the government may require
persons residing in the United States be subject to birth control regulation
even though their religious convictions run contrary to such a policy. By
placing anti-fertility agents in the water supply, the government is enforc-
ing its birth control measures against all members of this country without
regard to the dictates of their religion. One of the earliest cases addressing
itself to this basic issue was Jacobson v. Massachusetts.23  In this case Jacob-
son refused to allow himself to receive a smallpox vaccination in accord-
ance with state and local law requiring such. The Court would not sustain
his refusal stating that: "[A]ccording to settled principles the police power
of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health
and the public safety."24
Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court bear directly on the problem
at hand. The first of these, Braunfeld v. Brown,25 concerned the constitu-
tional validity of a Peunsylvania criminal statute which proscribes the Sun-
day retail sale of certain commodities. Appellants were merchants who
engaged in the retail sale of clothing and home furnishings, both items
being within the proscription of the statute. Each of the appellants were
members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which requires its members to
abstain from work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall on each Sat-
21 ld. at 496-97.
22 Id. at 504.
23 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
24 Id. at 25.
21366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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urday. Appellants sought an injunction against the enforcement of the
Pennsylvania statute. Each of them claimed that they had done a sub-
stantial amount of business on Sunday and that loss of such business would
lead to economic ruin.
The appellants argued that the enforcement of the Pennsylvania statute
would deny them the free exercise of their religion since, due to the stat-
utes compulsion that their businesses be dosed on Sunday, appellants will
suffer economic loss, to the advantage of their non-Sabbitarrian competi-
tors, if the appellants continue their observance of Saturday. This result
will either compel appellants to forego their Sabbath observance, or put
them at a serious competitive disadvantage if they continue to adhere to
their religious beliefs. Such a result they claim would be a violation of the
first amendment's free exercise clause since their religion is being subject
to discriminatory treatment by the state.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellants argument.
[T]he freedom to act, even when the action is in accord with one's
religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions.
[Llegislative power over mere opinion is forbidden but it may reach
people's actions when they are found to be in violation of important so-
cial duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions are de-
manded by one's religion 26
The Court then enunicated the ruling in the case.
Of course, to hold unassailable all legislation regulating conduct which
imposes solely an indirect burden on the observance of religion would be
a gross oversimplification. If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede
the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously be-
tween religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden
may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates
conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect
of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite
its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish
its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.27
A similar view was advocated in Sherbert v. Verner.28 Appellant was
a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, who was discharged by
her employer because she refused to work on Saturday, the day of her
Sabbath. When she was unable to find other employment because of her
devotion to her religion concerning its ban on work during the Sabbath,
the appellant applied for unemployment compensation in accordance with
the South Carolina statute. The appellee Employment Security Commission
refused appellant's request on grounds that her self-imposed restriction
upon working on the Sabbath brought her within the provisions of the stat-





ute disqualifying her for benefits. The provision refused unemployment
benefits to those insured workers who fail, "without good cause,... to ac-
cept available suitable work when offered by the employment office or the
employer . 20 Appellant appealed, claiming a denial of her free exer-
cise of religion.
The Court sustained appellant's claim, distinguishing Braunfeld on the
grounds that in that case there was a showing of a compelling state interest
while in this case there was no such showing.
In these respects, then, the state interest asserted in the present case is
wholly dissimilar to the interests which were found to justify the less
direct burden upon religious practices in Braunfeld v. Brown .. .. The
statute was ... saved by a countervailing factor which finds no equivalent
in the instant case-a strong state interest in providing one uniform day
of rest for all workers.30
These cases support the proposition that the state is free to exercise its
legislative power to institute birth control provided its interest is compelling,
the means chosen are reasonable, and the nature of the legislation is secular
in purpose. If the state's right to declare Sunday a day of rest is constitu-
tional, then the use of anti-fertility agents to effectuate birth control is con-
stitutional a fortiori.
The Equal Protection Clause
We have already ascertained that the state can regulate provided it can
show a compelling state interest. The problem that develops in the equal
protection area arises once the government decrees that the antidote (to the
anti-fertility agent) shall be distributed on some basis other than one man-
one antidote. For the sake of this discussion, I shall decree the govern-
mental policy to be that only those married couples whose I.Q's (assuming
a fairly accurate test by the year 2000) are above a given point (X) shall
be administered the antidote. One of the considerations the legislature
made in choosing X is that it is the point at which population growth shall
be maintained. The overriding policy consideration was that due to a highly
complex society; the country required a larger supply of people, and that
such a policy would facilitate this desired end (assume again that scientific
evidence discloses that those people with I.Q's of X or higher propagate
more intelligent offspring than does the population as a whole and this is the
least costly method). In order to ascertain whether the equal protection clause
has been violated by such a law, one must first determine the meaning of
equal protection. The essence of the doctrine is that those who are similarly
situated must be treated in a similar fashion. "[W]hat the equal protec-
tion of the law requires is equality of burdens upon those in like situation
20 Id. at 401.
30 Id. at 408.
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or condition."' Conversely, those things that are different in fact need not
be treated as if they were the same. "[Tihe equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination with respect to things that are different."3 2
The nature of the problem lies in determining the test of equal protec-
tion. What the equal protection clause outlaws are classifications which are
irrational in that they treat those in similar situations in dissimilar fashion.
For a legislative classification to be constitutional, it must at least manifest
a reasonable (rational) relation between the classification and the purpose
of the legislation. Thus, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,3 the Court ruled Okla-
homa's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act a violation of equal protection.
The statute provided for the compulsory sterilization of those persons
who have been "convicted two or more times for crimes amounting to fel-
onies involving moral turpitude ... .,' The statute excluded from its
dictates "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, re-
venue acts, embezzlement, or political offense .... ,85 In ruling the act un-
constitutional, the Court said:
When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the
other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a par-
ticular race or nationality for oppressive treatment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins.
Sterilization of those who have thrice committed grand larceny, with im-
munity for those who are embezzlers, is a dear, pointed, unmistakable
discrimination.3
The Court went on to say:
We have not the slightest basis for inferring that that line has any
significance in eugenics, nor that the inheritability of criminal traits follows
the neat legal distinctions which the law has marked . . . . In terms of
fines and imprisonment, the crimes of larceny and embezzlement rate the
same under the Oklahoma code. Only when it comes to sterilization are
the pains and penalties of the law different.37
The Court in Skinner ruled the Act irrational since the classification was
underinclusive. The Court did not, however, outlaw all classifications that
clashed with personal rights. Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in his concurrence,
referred to the point. "Undoubtedly a state may, after appropriate inquiry,
constitutionally interfere with the personal liberty of the individual to pre-
vent the transmission by inheritance of his socially injurious tendencies." 88
31 State of South Carolina ex tel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U.S. 619,
624 (1934).
32 Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 624 (1934).
33316 U.S. 535 (1942).
341d. at 536.
35Id. at 537.
36 Id. at 541.
371d. at 542.
38 Id. at 544.
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Another kind of classification that gives rise to a somewhat more strin-
gent equal protection test is that which is made on the basis of race, religion,
or some other sensitive criteria. The rational relation test is still involved,
yet in instances of such a classification the Court will examine the classifi-
cation with very close scrutiny. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court
in Korematsu v. United States"' made this point explicit. "It should be
noted, to begin with, that all legal restructions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect. '40 In this second category
of classifications, the Court is most concerned with the legislative purpose
in enacting the legislature. Black, speaking again in Korematsu states that
this is so:
Our task would be simple, our duty dear, were this a case involving
the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of
racial prejudice .... Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area
because of hostility for him or his race. He was excluded because we are
at war with the Japanese Empire....41
In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,42 the Court struck down a
California law which barred aliens from commercial fishing privileges in
the coastal waters. The Court said that such a classification was a viola-
tion of equal protection whether its purpose was "to conserve fish in the
California coastal waters, or to protect California citizens engaged in com-
mercial fishing from competition by Japanese aliens, or for both reasons. '43
The first purpose is a violation of equal protection since the classification
is not rationally related to the legitimate purpose of the legislature. Even
considering that there is a rational relation to the second purpose, the
statute still suffers because that purpose is invalid.
What follows from this analysis is that a classification that is related to
a legislative purpose is not enough. The equal protection clause has an ad-
ditional test. The purpose must be constitutionally legitimate. In order to
determine whether the legislative purpose is valid, one must first under-
stand the role of the equal protection clause.
One does not have a constitutional right to equality in and of itself.
One has the right to equality for a purpose, the purpose being a constitu-
tionally protected privilege. What the equal protection clause actually
protects is the right of a person to have equal access to that privilege. The
classification and the right infringed upon by the classification are too inex-
tricably woven to allow one to simply inquire into the reasonableness of
the former without paying cognizance to the latter. The importance of
3) 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
40Id. at 216.
41Id. at 223.
42334 U.S. 410 (1948).
431d. at 418.
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equality is contingent on the salience of the right involved. And if that
right is a fundamental one, then the test of equal protection is no longer
rational relation but rather compelling state interest. Since the problem
we are concerned with in this article involves a Griswold right, the equal
protection clause will require not merely a national legislative purpose but
rather a compelling purpose if the classification for the determination of
distributing the antidote be deemed constitutional.44
Ronald M. Baker
44 1t must be pointed out that the use of anti-fertility agents can be subject to dangerous
abuse and should only be employed under the strictest of regulatory supervision.
